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At Durban on the 31st of May 1951, in a tumultuous general meeting of the Natal ANC, 
veteran rough and tumble Zulu politician A W G Champion was overthrown and removed 
from the provincial presidency, a post he had held since 1945. It was a dramatic defeat, 
signalling the end of old-line leadership opposed to the demands of the Congress Youth 
League for militant defiance of apartheid. The victor, as is well known, was Chief Albert J 
Luthuli, teacher, farmer, chief of a Christian Kholwa community, and a relative newcomer to 
national politics. Accounts of Champion's political demise have generally subordinated the 
event to wider perspectives, asserting more or less briefly and simply that it was determined 
by personal foibles and engineered by the Youth League. This paper attempts to draw out 
some details of Champion's presidency and its breakdown, in the belief that they may add to 
understanding of its circumstances. 
The 1951 election itself serves well to open the issues, personalities and behaviour that 
shaped the confrontation and its outcome. Champion himself presided over his own 
downfall, occupying the chair throughout in violation of the normal practice of having the 
meeting chaired by the speaker of the house. In typical fashion, Champion had also 
arbitrarily set aside the constitutional provision for branch delegate voting and declared the 
meeting open to all, over-ruling a notice issued by Henry Selby Msimang as provincial 
secretary. [l] Behind this move was a struggle over control of membership and branches 
which could determine the election. 
The meeting was, in fact, a resumption of one in January that had been aborted in an open 
quarrel between Champion and Msimang. The secretary had been loyal to Champion 
through thick and thin since the latter's accession, but the two had fallen out in the previous 
year when Msimang had accepted Youth League affiliation against Champion's will. 
Accusing Msimang of conspiring with the League to undermine him by establishing 
insurgent branches, Champion had demanded that the secretary obtain prior approval from , 
the executive committee to form them, a policy Msimang rejected as a contravention of his 
constitutional duties. [2] Following the January meeting, Champion's subservient committee 
had declared Msimang suspended for insubordination and dereliction of duty. [3] Now, as 
the proceedings resumed, constitutionality became the ground on which the confrontation 
between the president and his opponents was fought to a finish. 
At the outset the call for approval of the previous minutes became a debate of no confidence 
in the president. Luthuli protested against opening the vote to all: was this a properly 
constituted meeting or not? He had served on the Natal executive since Champion's 
accession in 1945 (itself unconstitutional), but had refused on constitutional principle to 
continue after 1949 when the annual conference had authorized Champion to appoint his own 
executive without elections in an effort to suppress opposition. At that time Msimang had 
supported Champion unreservedly and criticized Luthuli. [4] Now Msimang also objected to 
the open vote. Only branch delegates should vote. The president retorted that, in the absence 
of certified delegates, he could choose the method. He chose to involve all the people "in 
order to rebuild Congress". 
Rebuilding Congress was surely in their minds when a member of the recently established 
Cato Manor branch objected to labelling it "unauthorized" and an "emr". Champion 
retorted that there was only one Durban branch and only the executive committee would 
decide when others should be opened. If the Congress was not satisfied they could remove 
him on a vote of no confidence. Youth Leaguer Selby Ngcobo jumped up to accuse him of 
lying to them about the reason for Msimang's dismissal. It was not insubordination, it was 
his chairmanship of the June 26 1950 Day of Protest strike which Champion had refused to 
lead despite the fact that he had presided at the public meeting with Indians, Coloureds and 
Whites when it had been decided on. The president angrily demanded Ngcobo retract his 
accusation. Anger filled the hall - so much so "that even the atmosphere ... smelled badly". 
Ngcobo withdrew his words and finally the vote for the minutes - a test of strength - was 
taken: 78 to 34. The numbers suggest that Champion's support was ample. They also seem 
surprisingly few, considering the reports that stressed the size and significance of the 
gathering. Clearly the ANC of Natal was hardly a "mass" party. 
Had Champion packed the meeting? Clearly many believed so. But the votes began to go 
against him when Luthuli, observing that since the chair insisted the conference was for the 
public - the nation - moved that the executive committee's report, which was a bill of charges 
against Msimang, was no report at all of the nation's affairs and should be rejected. 
Champion was this time defeated 80 to 84. Numbers were increasing, people were entering 
the hall. 
Selby Msimang now spoke in his own defence. He emphasized loyalty to the national cause, 
not to Champion. Accepting the Youth Leaglre was just carrying out a decision of the 
national executive. His real "faultyy, therefore, was his diligence in obeying this mandate. 
His second "faultyy was to accept and cany out the agreement for the Day of Protest on June 
26 1950, at what he had taken to be Champion's invitation. Only later, he said, when 
Champion said he had just been "tempting" him to take this measure, did Msimang realize 
with a "fright" that the president had hoped to involve him in a debacle. Realizing these 
things, he had refused to make reports or to hand over the records to the "illegal" executive 
committee (ignoring his own support of its appointment in 1949). Finally, he struck a 
dominant note of personal criticism for Champion: his "liking for hero-worship". To follow 
him in his way, said Msimang, would be "destroying the nation". 
Champion apparently expected Msimang to be his opponent in the election to follow, as did 
many others. Remarking simply that nothing the secretary had said contradicted the charges 
against him, he proceeded to the nominations for president. Only that morning, however, 
Youth League leaders had approached Luthuli and asked him to stand. He agreed when 
Msimang, who was also being touted by some of the leaders of the League, withdrew. 
Champion called for a division of the house, his supporters on one side, Luthuli's on the 
other. But, as the day had worn on, changes had taken place in the composition of the body. 
In accordance with Champion's procedure, people were being brought in by both sides, 
recruited from the street, tea-rooms, offices and sports grounds. Perhaps Champion 
miscalculated. Later he insisted that he had intended the result, counting Luthuli's supporters 
until they were a majority, because he had already decided to "retire" and to do it 
dramatically. Heads were counted, the vote was close: 115 Luthuli; 105 Champion. [5] 
Champion rose then and there, called Luthuli to the platform and handed him into the chair. 
Luthuli later said it was "a fair majority". [6] True enough, yet it was a close one for an 
event since considered to be a dramatic repudiation of an isolated and compromised leader 
and a decisive choice for a new course of action. 
Immediately after, in letters and articles to the press, Champion justified himself. "To me the 
Congress leadership had become a curse." He was "more than satisfied", he wrote, for he 
knew he was increasingly disliked, even hated by some, and people avoided the Congress 
because of it. The times demanded a popular voice expressed in a popular vote. As for 
packing, he had invited the Youth League to bring their friends and vote. They packed it 
themselves. "About 70 people came from ... tea rooms and circuses ... If I had aimed at 
returning to office I would have refused to admit them." And so he let "the educated class of 
our people" win. Few have accepted at face value Champion's claim to have deliberately 
engineered his retirement, even though one can see good reasons from his own perspective to 
have done so and he had spoken of it for some months. [7] More typically, for example, Bill 
Bhengu, a Youth Leaguer who had also been Champion's protege and later a prominent 
Durban lawyer, sees it as a rationalization for a plan gone awry as Champion's supporters 
wearied of waiting and were literally "out to lunch" while the Youth League energetically 
imported their own recruits. Dividing the house was a means to intimidate voters that 
failed. [g] 
Champion went on: because he could not accept the tactics of the Programme of Action, he 
was seen as a bar to progress. But he could not promote boycotts and strikes "with the forces 
at my disposal ... I am in favour of war", he insisted, "but war without weapons is 
committing suicide. I am not in favour of committing political suicide, because by doing that 
we are helping our oppressors." He had now washed his hands of responsibility, but he 
wanted Congress to succeed. "I want freedom. If this Congress ... can do this I would be 
pleased." He complimented Luthuli: "I hand over to a better man. Time will show if he has 
really a larger following than me." There was slyness in this, of course, for Champion could 
not let go without exercising his inveterate habit of mixing his signals and sowing seeds of 
ambiguity, and he let it be known that he viewed the new leaders with scepticism and the 
Youth League with scorn - "people who are inexperienced and know nothing yet think they 
know something". He said he doubted they could do better and would come to respect him 
from the vantage of their own experience. He suggested they had been shown up by 
accepting his unconstitutional overthrow. "Luthuli ... always insisting [on] legal procedure ... 
did not refuse to take part in ... my illegal procedure." He could not resist a parting shot at 
Msimang, and warned Luthuli: "I do not give him any hopes concerning his secretary." [g] 
For the participants of 1951, Champion's overthrow would have evoked ironic echoes and 
wry memories of 1945. The two events bear comparison. Then Champion was the insurgent 
and challenger, the hope of the frustrated and the disaffected; John L Dube the conservative, 
his independent and somnolent Natal Native Congress the thorn in the side of a resurgent 
ANC under Alfred Xuma. Rivalry between Dube and Champion was a centre-piece of 
African politics from the 1920s, with Champion the brash ICU activist. In 1927, according 
to Champion, urged by ANC president Gumede, he helped Chief Stephen Mini attempt a 
take-over of Dube's secessionist Natal branch. Both sides packed the meeting, and Dube was 
out-voted, resulting in his formation of the independent NNC. [l01 By the 1940s Dube was 
in decline. Champion, active in national politics since the late 1930s and increasingly 
prominent (and respectable) as a newly elected member of the Natives' Representative 
Council for rural Natal in 1942, moved to centre stage with Xuma's encouragement and the 
active support of local members of the group that was then forming the Youth League. For 
example, his successful sponsorship of a well advertised Conference of Educated Africans in 
1943 was a conscious appeal for support against Dube and won him recognition as a leader to 
revitalize Natal politics. "[After] years of a static and colourless political life", Ilanga lase 
Natal enthused, "At last the people want to have a say, and Champion is that say." Youth 
Leaguers Jordan Ngubane and Selby Ngcobo, active in the conference, saw Champion 
opening up the chances for youth and courted him to take the leadership in Natal in the name 
of rebuilding the ANC with "viable branches and dignity for our people". This was a pattern 
of promoting senior leaders perceived to be progressive (or malleable) that became a Youth 
League hallmark. 
Champion's opportunity came with Dube's retirement after a crippling stroke in 1944, 
leaving the ineffectual Rev Abner S Mtimkulu as acting president and heir apparent. The 
election on April 2,1945, transpired in somewhat similar fashion to that of 1951, its 
procedures constitutionally compromised. When Mtirnkulu belatedly tried to enforce strict 
delegate voting, Champion objected, demanding that all present should participate. 
Mtimkulu tried to adjourn, vacating the chair and leaving the hall. None other than Albert 
Luthuli took the platform as acting chairman and, with the support of Selby Msimang and 
Jordan Ngubane, Champion was elected. The three became members of Champion's 
executive committee, Msimang in the key post of provincial secretary, Luthuli for agriculture 
and Ngubane for youth. [ l  l] Particularism, personal politics, insurgencies and loose 
procedure were nothing new. Champion had risen in a strong tradition. 
The relationship between Champion and Msirnang was central to Champion's presidency. 
Msimang was a team player devoted to collegial leadership, highly intelligent and 
imaginative, given to large conceptions and schemes, and at times capable of surprisingly 
grandiloquent notions and rhetoric. The two worked closely, membership and branches 
grew, with attention not only to urban but especially to rural areas where Champion had 
strong connections with chiefs from ICU days. Indeed, his dependence on this network of 
influence stimulated the Zulu particularism that was a marked feature of his provincial 
leadership. It was the backbone of the ANC in Natal. 
In early 1948 Champion helped Msimang win election to the Natives Representative Council 
from urban areas. He himself was a nual representative, as was Luthuli. The election 
featured a dispute with Luthuli over Champion's use of Congress in the election to unseat a 
non-Congress candidate. Luthuli wished to be mindful of the "boycott NRC" policy of the 
League and keep Congress out of the election. Msimang took the occasion to express 
adulatory support for Champion and deep suspicion of Luthuli. He urged that they use 
Congress all they could to consolidate their NRC positions and vice vera. Warning that 
Luthuli would eventually make a "bid for Natal leadership", Msimang - perhaps consciously 
playing to Champion's "liking for hero-worship", assured him that he would "remain a 
humble musket-bearer under your leadership for all time" and that he would soon offer him a 
grand plan of action. "My whole ambition is to see you rise in the scale of leadership so as to 
eclipse the late Dr Dube. Natal, through you, must lead South Africa ... You have it in you, 
Mahlathi, to do it ... IT LIES WITH US." [l21 
Msimang's plan was a comprehensive economic development scheme that went far beyond 
the Congress National Fund proposed in various forms during these years to support action 
programmes. It would link chief, rural constituencies and the Zulu monarchy with Congress, 
solve its financial problems and combine all politics in one national movement. By 1949 it 
had taken the form of a projected Zulu National Development Corporation and Msimang was 
also manoeuvring to persuade his employers, the African Mutual Credit Association 
(AMCA) - a speculative subscription fund under white management (eventually convicted 
for fraud) - to invest in the corporation. Above all, the chiefs, always the main financial 
support of the Natal Congress, were supposed to be persuaded to sell "hundreds of thousands 
of cattle to provide us with ... millions ... [to] extricate ourselves from economic strangulation 
threatening our people ... I am banking entirely on your support." "The war between 
ourselves and the Government is an economic one ... that without adequate capital we cannot 
hope to win." 
Thus did the entrepreneurial spirit stir Selby Msimang in the service of the nation, alarmed as 
he was at the National Party victory and the advancing menace of apartheid. It was a grand 
conception, but it asked too much. Chiefs baulked, rural people doubted its practical use to 
them and were wary of any collection scheme, especially one that smacked of cattle culling. 
Champion, the pragmatist, and never one for visionary politics, seems to have viewed the 
scheme with a mixture of hope and scepticism. He understood the limitations of his 
constituency and advised Msimang that they suspected him and felt "he should first serve the 
urban Natives as their representative". Perhaps he was becoming alarmed at Msimang's 
energetic promotion as a challenge to his own pre-eminence. But he certainly emphasized 
the fund and touted it widely. It seems clear that he relied increasingly on Msimang's 
development idea as the basis of a strategy resting on the national alliance with chiefs and 
monarchy, that made sense to him, that would empower African leadership independently of 
other groups and could counter the rising influence and demands of the Youth League, which 
he considered not only presumptuous but dangerously premature. He began to refer to the 
fund as separate from Congress and not under its control. This was not a new idea, however. 
Even Luthuli had advised it in 1945. [l31 
Msimang, meanwhile, had returned from the 1948 national conference enthused by the Youth 
League's draft Programme of Action. He saw the development scheme as quite compatible 
with it and bent his efforts to promoting the draft Programme in Natal. But by 1950 he was 
deeply frustrated. Congress was faltering. His annual report for 1949 spoke of a 
"disheartening" and "hopeless" situation, with organization deteriorating and branches in 
confusion, finances in permanent deficit, poor support from national headquarters, an 
"absence of militant policy" and "an absolute lack of teamwork" in the executive committee. 
This last situation led him to support Champion's hand-picked executive. [l41 
Returning from the 1949 national conference where the Programme of Action was adopted as 
national Congress policy, Msimang plunged with redoubled energy into an effort to pull the 
factions of Natal together in 1950. His correspondence with Champion suggests that he was 
getting desperate, and even possibly a little delusive. Searching for a way out of Natal's 
stasis, he told Champion that the National Development Corporation could become the front 
for an "underground organisation" linking Champion with monarchy and chiefs in "a 
gigantic economic programme" that would protect the chiefs from overt political 
entanglement with Congress in the face of the impending Suppression of Communism Act, 
then before Parliament. One senses that he hoped this would induce Champion to go along 
with the Youth League with his rural base uncompromised. With the influence of Champion 
and Prince Cyprian, Msimang enthused, "we can raise three million pounds or more". 
Referring to Heaton Nicholls's book, Bayete, he went on to even more exciting prospects. "I 
am sure ... you cannot help but appreciate the amount of damage without spilling of blood we 
can do to upset the whole government structure of this country and seize power." Champion 
replied laconically, "I am glad you are now prepared to forget about cattle. Let us make a 
renewed effort to organise a big fund in 1950." [l51 
But events were rapidly overtaking them as the new national leadership swung into play, 
intent on trials of the tactics of boycott, stay-at-home strikes, civil disobedience and non- 
African co-operation. In Natal, the simmering conflict between Champion and the Youth 
League came to a head in ever more acid exchanges. Msimang at last resolved to confront 
his dilemma. Champion had all along insisted that the Youth League must join as 
individuals, not en bloc as a separate body, for they would then become a Trojan horse. As 
the May Day demonstrations and Day of Protest approached, however, Msimang became 
convinced that they must "close ranks" in accordance with national policy, at "whatever 
cost". Between April and June he handed over membership cards en bloc to Youth League 
secretary M B Yengwa and negotiated elaborate terms of association which, he believed, 
would give Champion's "senior Congress" effective powers "to guide, control and encourage 
youth along sane lines". In June he reported all of this to Champion, probably with some 
trepidation. [l 61 
June was the watershed for Msimang and Champion. As already indicated, estrangement 
was also signalled by Msimang's assumption of leadership in the Day of Protest. Despite his 
own doubts about the wisdom and timing of it, this was an act of conscience as well as policy 
when Champion refused to co-operate without direct control of funds. Suddenly a bombshell 
struck Msimang. On 24 June, AMCA dismissed him from employment on grounds of 
incitement to break the law on the Day or Protest. He was staggered. A linchpin of his 
development scheme was gone. His appeal rejected, Msimang joined the ranks of the 
unemployed, among the one thousand who lost their jobs in Durban as a result of the 
strike. [l71 
By August Champion and Msimang were at loggerheads and the break was virtually 
complete. Champion was relentlessly offended and unshakeably opposed to Msimang's 
policy, Msimang was determinedly going his way standing on principle. He now worked 
with the Youth League in attempts to develop Congress organization, including the disputed 
new branches in Durban. He wrote to Chanipion, evoking the memory of rivalry with Dube. 
"It is definitely inconsistent for you, of all persons, to do to Youth League what you would 
not allow 
Dr Dube to do to you. You regarded Dr Dube's conduct ... as unnatural and unworthy of a 
national leader. Would it be right or even constitutional of me to support an unnational and 
unworthy attitude of a leader? ... I have followed my conscience in the light of a national 
cause in which we are both concerned to be my judge and monitor." 1181 
Champion huffed: "Any leader who wishes to keep good balances [sic] must always act as I 
have done ... It becomes my duty not to be swayed by irresponsible tide [sic] of enthusiasm 
such as you seem to be a victim." And, finally, to the press, a characteristic expression of 
personal pique: "From June, 1950, the Congress leadership has been assumed by 
Mr Msimang ... The very intellectual I have introduced to many people in Natal and Zululand 
has turned against me." As we have seen, Msimang weathered the storm and was vindicated 
by re-election to the provincial secretaryship upon Champion's defeat. His own views, 
however, despite his opening to the Youth League, were not wholly in agreement with the 
developing strategy and tactics of the new leaders, particularly with the onset of the Defiance 
Campaign. In a way that seems to echo Champion's strictures about "balance" and "tides of 
enthusiasmyy: he publicly objected to the actions of the Joint Planning Council - a partnership 
arrangement with the South African Indian Congress - for "practically taking over the control 
and leadership of the African National Congress". He fully supported the 1949 Programme 
of Action, but opposed "any form of ultimatum being issued in an atmosphere of 
boisterousness and bunkum". Before the campaign began he resigned. [20] 
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